


















The latest wave of globalization, 
which includes European integration 
processes, has brought about new chal-
lenges to the processes of democrati-
zation. Among the key problems is the 
evolving power of both governments 
and the supranational financial and 
economic power centers, including in-
tergovernmental organizations such as 
the World Bank, IMF and OECD. In 
this article, we will examine the trends 
in the relationships between the nation-
al executives and national legislatures 
in relation to the globalization/Euro-
peanization processes. Since a core of 
post-communist countries have recent-
ly undergone a transition to democracy, 
a consolidation of democracy, as well as 
European integration, and since all these 
processes have been very much embed-
ded in the latest wave of globalization, 
they make for a good example in terms 
of analyzing the interference of the pro-
cesses and their outcome.
Unlike the old EU member states, 
which originally initiated European in-
tegration processes for reasons of eco-
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Summary This article examines the recent processes of globalization and (within this 
framework) Europeanization, with a focus on the changes in national political systems 
(particularly in post-communist EU member states) due to the pressures of these proces-
ses. The main thesis is that national executives have been gaining power in relation to the 
legislative due to international pressures. The international financial and economic crisis 
has added to this trend as countries become more financially dependent on internation-
al centers of power which demand efficient economic liberalization from national execu-
tives as a precondition for the required international loans. The case study of Slovenia is 
presented from a comparative perspective (in some aspects being a deviant case) so as 
to offer new theoretical insights into the mechanisms of strengthening the national exe-
cutives.
























nomy and security, the post-communist 
states joined these processes in the 1990s 
based on expectations that the proces-
ses would also bring about a boost to de-
mocratization. Even though the post-
2004 EU member states had been close-
ly monitored during the accession stage 
and pressured to fulfill (among other 
things) the Copenhagen political crite-
ria, this pressure dissipated once these 
countries had become full EU members. 
The exception being the recent mem-
bers: Rumania, Bulgaria and Croatia. 
Additionally, concern has been growing 
that the EU as a regional political system 
is failing to meet its own criteria of de-
mocracy. Researchers highlight the pro-
cesses that have led to increasing the role 
of the executive and the democratic de-
ficit in the EU political system.
Our thesis in this article is that, in 
post-communist states that have joined 
the European integration processes, 
the national executive has been gaining 
power in relation to the legislative due 
to the combined effects of (1) the do-
mestic consolidation of democracy in 
post-communist EU member states, (2) 
the pressures of international economic 
liberalization, and (3) Europeanization 
(understood as the adaptations made to 
the domestic political system in order to 
manage EU affairs). The current finan-
cial and economic crisis is strengthening 
this trend whilst simultaneously allow-
ing more radical changes to take place in 
a relatively short time frame. 
Our argument is based on: (1) re-
search into the processes of consolida-
tion of post-communist democracies 
since the democratic transition, in par-
ticular examining the changing relation-
ship between the executive and the legis-
lature (at the expense of legislature); (2) 
research into the impacts of the global 
pressure for economic liberalization on 
the political power restructuring of the 
national political systems (strengthen-
ing the executive in financially-depend-
ent countries); and (3) research into the 
national adaptations made in order to 
manage EU affairs (the strengthening 
of national executives at the expense of 
national parliaments), while also tak-
ing account of the intervention of the in-
ternational financial and economic cri-
sis. The thesis is tested in depth on the 
case of Slovenia. In line with Dogan and 
Pe’lassy’s suggestions regarding the case 
study methodological strategy (Dogan 
and Pe’lassy, 1990: 107-110), this case is 
not selected as an illustration, but rath-
er as a comparative case study, and in 
some aspects as a deviant case study that 
brings about new theoretical insights. 
The case of Slovenia closely resembles 
that of Sweden in that (1) it represents 
an example of a country joining the EU 
after the European Council had already 
become well institutionalized and the 
national executives empowered, while 
(2) the increase in empowerment of the 
national executive has taken place due 
to Europeanization pressures even when 
domestic political circumstances had 
become unfavorable for the empower-
ment of the chief executive (Johansson 
and Tallberg, 2010). Slovenia also makes 
a good case study because it has not ex-
perienced any major constitutional or 
electoral engineering. The article builds 
on the existing research published by in-
ternational and Slovenian scholars.
The article is structured as follows. 
Firstly, we will present the research find-
ings on (1) the domestic processes of 
consolidation of young post-communist 
democracies, (2) the impacts of the glob-
al pressures for economic liberalization 


















of national executives, (3) the impacts of 
globalization (particularly Europeaniza-
tion) on the re-arrangement of nation-
al political systems, and (4) the impacts 
of the current global financial and eco-
nomic crisis on the re-arrangement of 
the relationships between the national 
executive and legislative. In a separate 
section, we will study the case of Slove-
nia in detail. This will be followed by the 
chapter Conclusions.
The Domestic Processes of 
Consolidation of Young Democracies
The power relationship between the 
national executives in the parliaments 
in the new democracies has changed 
dramatically. In the first decade follow-
ing the transition to democracy, parlia-
ments were particularly assertive and 
even aggressive in their attempts to con-
trol the executive (Olson, 2004; Mans-
feldova, Olson and Rakušanova, eds., 
2004; Ilonszki and Olson, 2011). The 
weaknesses of the executives in new de-
mocracies stemmed from the dynamic 
party systems and the fact that govern-
ments tended to be unstable. While the 
first decade was characterized by parlia-
ments frequently amending government 
bills (Olson and Norton, 2008: 174), the 
second decade was characterized by the 
increasing power of the executive in re-
lation to the legislative (Kopecký, 2004). 
Since party systems institutionalized 
and consolidated during the second 
decade, parties have been able to control 
their MPs and the executives have not 
only gained in power in relation to the 
parliaments but have actually begun to 
control them (Kopecký, 2004; Olson and 
Norton, 2008; Fish and Kroenig, 2009). 
However, a destabilization of many 
post-socialist party systems has recent-
ly been observed. This has included the 
phenomena of new parties both enter-
ing parliaments (see analyses by Allan 
Sikk, Tim Haughton and Kevin Deegan-
Krause) and joining the executives 
(Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, in print). 
In such circumstances, the strength-
ening of the executive may be more at-
tributable to the increasing importance 
of the interaction between the national-
level and EU-level decision-making (Jo-
hansson and Tallberg, 2010) than to the 
destabilized national politics.
The Impacts of the Global Pressures 
for Economic Liberalization and the 
Related Strengthening of the Role 
of National Executives
Since the 1970s, privatization and 
liberalization have become global rules. 
The early neoliberal reform (known 
also as ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reagonom-
ics’) brought about a new trend toward 
economic liberalism combined with a 
New Right understanding of the limit-
ed role of the state (characterized by a 
preference for a thin state, the percep-
tion that social problems were primarily 
the responsibility of private individuals 
and the family, and the rare intervention 
of the state in the field of social policy 
– only in extraordinary circumstances) 
as well as limited consultative politics 
– which in particular included the dis-
integration of partnership-like poli-
cy networks (such as policy communi-
ties in the United Kingdom and various 
neo-corporatist arrangements). The dif-
fusion of the neoliberal doctrine from 
countries like the USA, the United King-
dom and Australia has affected organi-
zations like the OECD, the World Bank, 
and the International Monetary Fund – 
IMF (Andrews, 2012: 103-104). It can be 
said that the diffusion of this idea has as-
























tional pressure on countries dependent 
on foreign financial support to follow 
the neoliberal paradigm. And the na-
tional executives of these countries have 
been held primarily responsible for ful-
filling the conditions set by these inter-
national organizations in order to access 
the international loans. Under such con-
ditions, the executives are pressured to 
perform efficiently in fulfilling the ex-
ternally-imposed obligations, often at 
the expense of domestic democratic de-
liberation and decision-making, while 
legislatives have been losing their power 
to challenge the executives.
Indeed, many post-communist coun-
tries were already dependent on inter-
national financing at the time of their 
transition to democracy. In such circum-
stances, the responsibility of national ex-
ecutives in fulfilling the (pre)conditions 
of international financial organizations 
(IFO) has made them more externally-
oriented in their actions, and this has had 
a detrimental effect on the involvement 
of other national actors. National parlia-
ments in post-communist countries in 
particular have lost ground to the exe-
cutives (also) due to the pressures for in-
ternational liberalization and their coun-
try’s subsequent dependence on IFOs. 
Furthermore, recent research reveals 
that domestic economic problems mo-
tivate governments to seek examples of 
successful policies, while international 
organizations offer channels for policy 
learning, and when both domestic and 
international factors interact, the effects 
of each are magnified (Fink, 2013). As 
a rule, post-communist countries expe-
riencing multiple transitions simultane-
ously (particularly during the 1990s) – 
referred to as ‘rebuilding the ship at sea’ 
(Elster, Offe, and Preuss with Boenker, 
Goetting and Rueb, 1998) – were in this 
position and were involved in many vo-
luntary international policy co-opera-
tion processes.
By voluntarily participating in EU 
integration processes, the post-commu-
nist countries in fact came under ad-
ditional pressure from the EU, which 
followed the same line as the other in-
ternational organizations. As a precon-
dition of EU membership, the EU pro-
moted economic rules which were well 
beyond the scope of the acquis commu-
nautaire proper, and thus created consi-
derable pressure for a form of neoliberal-
ism in the East (Grabbe, 2003; Andrews, 
2012). The EU has also implanted into 
the domestic politics of the accession 
states the international and transnation-
al dimension of a particular democra-
tic capitalist model which is unfriendly 
to consultative politics, especially so-
cial partnerships (Bohle and Gresko-
vits, 2007). In fact, Slovenia has been the 
only recent post-communist country in 
the EU in which a form of neo-corporat-
ism managed to interfere with the link-
ing of the national economy to the world 
economy; whereas in the other acces-
sion countries either a neoliberal type of 
capitalism (the Baltic states) or an em-
bedded neoliberal type (in the Visegrád 
countries) prevailed (ibid.).
The neoliberal shift emerged in the 
EU in 2005 and emphasized the need for 
growth and for considering pragmatic 
(neoliberal) means of overcoming the 
EU’s lagging behind the USA in terms of 
economic competitiveness (Ágh, 2010). 
The implementation of the Lisbon stra-
tegy (2000),1 which was created as a 
blueprint for a more competitive EU, 
1 Presidency Conclusions. Lisbon European 




















gave a boost to the implementation of 
experimentalist modes of governance. 
One such mode was the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC),2 which in the 
first instance involves governmental ac-
tors and selected experts (Borrás and 
Greve, eds., 2004; Radaelli, 2003; Borrás 
and Radaelli, 2010). In fact, the OMC 
empowered core executives through 
centralizing and politicizing the co-or-
dination of EU matters at the nation-
al level (Borrás and Peters, 2011). The 
neoliberal orientation effectively led to 
questions being asked about the EU’s 
democratic character, as well as to ques-
tions about the EU’s impact on national-
level democracy by the de facto increase 
in the involvement of the national exe-
cutives in soft EU policymaking dis-
tanced from democratic (national and 
supranational) policy processes.
The Impacts of Globalization 
(Particularly Europeanization) 
on the Re-Arrangement 
of National Political Systems 
Globalization has been closely linked 
to an increase in cooperation among go-
vernments in solving transnational, glo-
bal problems (see e.g. Webb, 1991; Ro-
senau and Czempiel, eds., 1992; Drezner, 
2001, 2007). Furthermore, global policy 
co-operation, policy co-ordination and 
dissemination have increasingly been 
taking place. In this context, European 
nations have been developing a unique 
regional political system, which includes 
sub-national, national, intergovernmen-
tal and supranational levels of authority 
and their mutual interactions.




General Trends within the Framework 
of the EU
The latest wave of globalization has 
induced the emergence of an increas-
ingly politically-integrated EU. The EU’s 
increasing economic integration has ne-
cessitated the creation of a regional po-
litical system which bears the hallmarks 
of a state. However, the EU has retained 
its double-tier functioning in the global 
context. Both individual member states 
as well as the EU as an entity play speci-
fic roles in the global policymaking. 
Nevertheless, the federal (supranati-
onal EU) and confederate (intergovern-
mental) elements still persist within the 
EU political system. Besides the usual 
intergovernmental character of multi-
level government (MLG) (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001), additional intergovern-
mental policy coordination is increas-
ingly common. MLG in the EU political 
system involves extensive policy coordi-
nation among bureaucrats and ministers 
in numerous working groups and com-
mittees linked to the European Com-
mission and the Council (Bergström, 
2005). Additionally, a domestic infor-
mation deficit about the usual MGL po-
licy coordination has evolved, which has 
disabled domestic legislatures attempt-
ing to effectively control their govern-
ment on EU matters (Raunio, 2007). 
The increased use of the OMC and oth-
er forms of intergovernmental policy co-
ordination in policy fields in which the 
EU is not allowed to make binding legis-
lation further obscures the related policy 
processes. It is because the non-binding 
nature of ‘soft law instruments’ effective-
ly involves the national executives that it 
also offers a possible way of expanding 
the role and power of the EU-level exe-
cutive: the Commission (ibid.: 165-167). 
























to effectively control the executive in 
MGL policy processes, and have done 
even less to control national executives 
within the framework of the OMC to 
such an extent that the OMC poses a se-
rious threat to the actual decision-mak-
ing role of national parliaments (ibid.: 
169-170, 172). This is particularly the 
case for accession countries, which are 
not only expected to adopt the hard law 
(the acquis), but also the soft law (the 
Bologna reform of higher education be-
ing an indicative example).
Furthermore, the national politi-
cal systems of EU member states have 
had to adapt to managing EU affairs 
‘at home’. Research into the experien-
ces of the older EU member states has 
shown that national executives adapt-
ed first and most compared to other 
national institutions. National parlia-
ments have not only been latecomers to 
the process of Europeanization, but also 
‘losers’ or even ‘victims’ of Europeani-
zation (see Norton, ed., 1996; Maurer 
and Wessels, eds., 2001; Raunio, 2008). 
While parliaments have – at least on a 
functional level – adapted to their role of 
giving legitimacy to the national execu-
tives, they have largely failed to build a 
connection between voters and EU-level 
policy processes (Auel and Raunio, eds., 
2012). Since EU matters tend to be de-
bated in parliamentary working bodies 
and are only seldom plenary, and since 
the specialized EU committees in many 
EU countries are closed to the public 
(Raunio, 2011), parliaments in fact add 
to the overall diminishing transparency 
of EU policy processes. Indeed, the EU 
rule transfer involving not only acquis 
conditionality but also democratic con-
ditionality has not prevented the adap-
tation of national systems in new post-
communist EU members (see more in 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) 
at the expense of national parliaments 
and the overall transparency of (EU) 
policymaking.3
Post-communist New EU Member States
By the time the accession proces-
ses were under way, the executives had 
already begun to dominate the parlia-
ments in the accession states. Moreover, 
these executives of the post-communist 
accession states had also represented the 
countries in the negotiations with the 
EU. As a rule, these processes had not 
been transparent enough to systemati-
cally involve national parliaments and 
the broader public. Furthermore, in 
order to insert the acquis into the le-
gal framework of the accession states, 
the bills needed to be adopted prior to 
full EU membership; consequently, par-
liaments were pressured into rapidly 
adopting them in order to catch up with 
the planned accession dynamics. Taking 
into account the trend in the empower-
ment of national executives, both in the 
process of accession negotiations and 
the national political system adaptations 
to full EU membership, the thesis of the 
3 For example, see Second Biannual Report: 
Developments in European Union Procedures 
and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scru-
tiny, prepared by the COSAC Secretariat and 
presented to the XXXII Conference of Com-
munity and European Affairs Committees of 
the Parliaments of the European Union (22-
23 November, 2004, the Hague, the Neth-
erlands) and Third Biannual Report: Deve-
lopments in European Union Procedures and 
Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, 
prepared by the COSAC Secretariat and pre-
sented to the XXXIII Conference of Com-
munity and European Affairs Committees of 
the Parliaments of the European Union (17-


















‘import of democratic deficit’ (Grabbe, 
2003) has proved to be correct at least to 
some extent.
The Undemocratic Alienation 
of the Executive as a Global 
and European Trend
For some time, researchers have ob-
served the presidentialization of parlia-
mentary democracies – that is to say, 
the shifting of national political power 
to favor the executive (Poguntke, 2000). 
Globalization and Europeanization have 
added to this phenomenon, especially 
when governments have negotiated in-
tergovernmentally coordinated policies 
or particular EU policies behind closed 
doors. In such processes, national par-
liaments not only lose control; they also 
find it difficult not to ratify the policies 
imposed on the national political sys-
tem. When Poguntke (ibid.) analyzes 
the presidentialization of European po-
litics, he also emphasizes that these Eu-
ropeanization processes do not benefit 
national governments in general, but in 
fact strengthen the party elites of the na-
tional governmental parties.
Overall, the main political trend 
is undemocratic in liberal-democratic 
terms. However, at least occasionally, in-
formation on the hidden segment of in-
tergovernmental and supranational/EU-
level decision-making is leaked to the 
public and receives democratic input – 
albeit a delayed one. A good example 
of such undemocratic alienation of the 
executive in the processes of globaliza-
tion and particularly Europeanization is 
the case of the Anti-counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA).4 The controversial 
4 Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/
tradoc_147937.pdf (22.8.2013). Anti-coun-
case of ACTA has raised an unprece-
dented public concern in the EU and 
in its member states due to the lack of 
transparency in the negotiating process. 
Public concerns have focused especial-
ly on the undermining of fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the EU by ACTA 
provisions. Furthermore, the agreement 
is believed to conflict both with the ac-
quis communautaire of the EU and with 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement (Matthews, 
2012). In this particular case, the EU has 
learnt a lesson in the pan-European mo-
bilization of civil society as well as in the 
increasing responsiveness of EU institu-
tions to public pressures and the block-
ing of the policy process that led to the 
implementation of ACTA. In this con-
text, the national actors of each country 
learned some lessons.
The Impacts of the Current Global 
Financial and Economic Crisis
The decision-making processes 
aimed at solving the financial and eco-
nomic crisis in the EU have occurred 
in such a way as to further strengthen 
the trend toward the overall empow-
erment of the national executives. Al-
though the crisis management primarily 
involved frequent but informal Council 
meetings, the decisions of these meet-
ings have been imposed on the member 
states. Without changing legal rules and 
without ensuring democratic legitimiza-
tion, the de facto power of both national 
executives and their intergovernmental 
meetings has increased. Furthermore, 
the additional subordination of national 
governments to macro-economic crite-
ria within the Eurozone has been intro-


























duced, which allows the supranational 
level to enforce the liberalization para-
digm (Jabko, 2011). The international 
financial organizations (IFO) offering 
the loans have also been in a position 
to dictate the austerity strategy to the 
governments of countries with budget-
ary debts, while the European Commis-
sion has used this as an opportunity to 
achieve its goal of fiscal consolidation.5 
In fact, the term ‘troika’ has even been 
coined to describe the European Union 
(EU)6 – in practice being represented 
by the EU’s executive arm, the Europe-
an Commission, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF); all three collabo-
rate closely in supervising the progress 
of Eurozone countries requiring bail-
out loans. It was the European Council 
(in fact, the intergovernmental body of 
EU member states), which on 25 March 
2011 adopted a decision which led to the 
amendment of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union by the 
insertion of a new paragraph into Ar-
ticle 136 of the Treaty, allowing for the 
use of the financial stability mechanism 
5 European Commission (2011) Annual 
Growth Survey: Advancing the EU’s compre-
hensive response to the crisis. Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Cen-
tral Bank, the European Economic and So-
cial Committee and the Committee of Re-
gions, COM (2011) 11 final. Brussels.
6 More on each of the three groups can be 
found in Kabir Chibber, Who Are the Troi-
ka that Greece Depends On?, BBC News 
Business, 4 October 2011, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/business-15149626 (18.8.2013). 
For other meaning of ‘troika’ in the EU con-
text, see What Is the ‘Troika’?, http://www.
eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/40/ 
(18.8.2013).
(ESM) to extend EU-level control over a 
particular EU member state which could 
be said to have endangered the stability 
of the Eurozone (De Witte, 2011). Giv-
en that the number of critical Eurozone 
countries has been increasing, it would 
seem pertinent to question both the le-
gitimacy and oversight of ever stronger 
European financial institutions, as well 
as the power relations between the EU 
member states with very different eco-
nomic and political power (Lord, 2012).7 
As already proven by the decision-mak-
ing on the 2007-2013 Financial Perspec-
tive, the Council holds the de facto upper 
hand in EU budgetary matters, and na-
tional interests (as presented by national 
executives) tend to dominate (Rant and 
Mrak, 2010: 347-348, 365-366). Nation-
al parliaments have been rather slow and 
differentiated in developing instruments 
to scrutinize the activity of their national 
executives regarding European Council 
meetings (Hefftler et al., 2013).
The post-communist EU member 
states have found themselves in a group 
of EU member states (together with the 
less-developed Mediterranean coun-
tries and Ireland) struggling for the sta-
tus of net recipient from the EU budget. 
Recently, the already peripheral role of 
post-communist member states (Watt, 
2012: 49-50) in the EU has been further 
worsened by the international financial 
and economic crisis. In fact, the crisis hit 
the peripheral countries of eastern and 
southern Europe and Ireland more than 
others (ibid.: 54-55). As the crisis in the 
Eurozone has been primarily interpret-
ed as a consequence of governmental 
mismanagement, the national govern-
7 The largest economies (particularly Germa-
ny) tend to dictate the conditions of particu-


















ments in the countries running a defi-
cit (which were in fact also peripheral 
countries) were not only blamed for the 
problems of their national budget defi-
cits but also pressured into introducing 
austerity measures (ibid.: 67) even after 
it had become obvious that such a stra-
tegy contributes to the increase in socio-
economic and political problems while 
failing to produce the expected results.
Ultimately, it can be said that the na-
tional executives have been gaining pow-
er in relation to the national legislatures, 
while at the same time the supranational 
executive in the case of EU and interna-
tional intergovernmental organizations 
have been gaining power over nation-
al executives. As the case of Greece has 
shown (particularly the subordination 
of the Greek government to suprana-
tional policies during the ongoing fiscal 
crisis), (1) such a pattern of governance 
can undermine the very foundations of 
the Lisbon governance architecture (An-
dreou, 2012), and (2) these power rela-
tions may persist even when the citizens 
in the particular country vigorously pro-
test the policies being imposed by such 
power constellations (Vradis and Dala-
koglou, eds., 2011).
The Case Study of Slovenia 
from a Comparative Perspective
In terms of the political develop-
ments of the last two decades, Slovenia 
shares several characteristics with oth-
er Central European post-communist 
countries as well as certain unique par-
ticularities. Among the shared charac-
teristics has been the increasing domi-
nance of the executive in relation to the 
legislative in the domestic processes of 
the consolidation of democracy. Slo-
venia – like all post-communist new 
EU member states – has also clearly 
strengthened the role and powers of the 
executive while adapting the national 
political system in order to manage EU 
matters. However, in opting for a mod-
el in which the national parliament plays 
a more prominent role in the national 
coordination of EU matters, Slovenia is 
unique. Also, Slovenia had (until very 
recently) proved to be an exception in 
terms of its socio-economic and finan-
cial situation. Since the start of its transi-
tional phase, Slovenia experienced suc-
cessful socio-economic developments 
and economic growth over the past two 
decades without dependence on interna-
tional financial loans, as well as having 
experienced a rather successful neo-cor-
poratist approach to solving macro-eco-
nomic policy problems. However, the 
recent international financial and eco-
nomic crisis has made Slovenia finan-
cially dependent on international loans 
and subordinated the national execu-
tive to the supranational centers of pow-
er. Meanwhile the national executive has 
begun to press on the legislative to adopt 
measures prepared by the national ex-
ecutive under the international and su-
pranational (EU) pressures. Therefore, 
Slovenia’s recent financial vulnerability 
threatens to question the country’s ex-
ceptionalism.
The Shifting Positioning of the 
Executive in the Domestic Processes of 
Consolidation in the Young Democracy
The Slovenian parliament has not 
been exceptional in re-arranging pow-
er relations between the parliament and 
the executive in favor of the latter to aid 
the process of democratic consolida-
tion. The beginning of democratic par-
liamentarism was characterized by the 
parliament’s frequent blocking of gov-
ernment initiatives, which even resulted 
























ed legislation – such as the laws relating 
to privatization (Zajc, 1994: 106). One of 
the main mechanisms by which the exe-
cutive has subsequently gained the up-
per hand has been a tendency toward 
frequent (mis)use of the institution of 
urgent (effectively meaning shorter) 
legislative procedure and governmental 
pressure on the parliament to adopt is-
sues on the parliamentary agenda, and 
more recently also the adoption of the 
rule that a bill may be sent back to the 
government for amending (Zajc, 2000: 
211). During the first two decades, the 
dependence of the executive on the par-
liamentary majority was established in 
such a way that the traditional relation-
ship between the government as the au-
thor and the parliament as the critic of 
bills did not exist (Rangus, 2012) – as 
with older democracies in recent histo-
ry. However, Slovenia’s executive-legis-
lative relationship today is exceptional, 
even by the standards of Central Europe-
an post-communist countries; the exe-
cutive is able to set the agenda of par-
liament and parliament’s policy outputs. 
According to Zubek (2011: 173), eighty-
six per cent of all the bills have come 
from the government, and their success 
has been the highest (ninety-five per-
cent) compared to the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary. As with the pro-
cess of consolidation of political par-
ties and the party system (Fink-Hafner, 
2012), governments have increasingly 
held to inter-party coalition agreements; 
in fact, political parties have increasing-
ly intruded in the legislative processes by 
shifting the key debate from the parlia-
mentary arena to the party arena (Igličar, 
2010). Consequently, the national par-
liament has shifted from its basic legis-
lative role toward a predominantly mo-
nitoring, representative and legitimizing 
role (Rangus, 2012: 243). This pattern of 
parliamentary-executive relations is not 
only similar to the second-decade pat-
tern witnessed in other Central Europe-
an post-communist countries (Ilonszki 
and Olson, 2011), but also to the second-
decade pattern in Spain and Portugal 
(Leston-Bandeira, 2004). However, what 
is striking in Slovenia is that, in light of 
the mismanagement of the financial and 
economic crisis as well as the numerous 
scandals, the consolidated party system 
has been radically shaken up. New par-
ties have not only gained a considerable 
share of the seats in the parliament, they 
have also dominated the executive (for 
details, see the European Journal of Po-
litical Science Political Data Yearbooks). 
From the domestic political point of 
view, the executive is regarded as par-
ticularly weak since the former leader of 
the Prime Minister’s own party has been 
charged by the Commission for the Pre-
vention of Corruption. The governing 
coalition is also regarded as fragile, and 
the level of trust in the government re-
mains very low.8
The Impacts of Global Pressures 
for Economic Liberalization and the 
Related Strengthening of the Role 
of the National Executive
Until very recently, Slovenia’s excep-
tionalism was marked by a resistance to 
the pressures of international liberaliza-
tion. This was primarily due to the fact 
that the country had not been depend-
ent on international financial organiza-
tions. Also, Slovenia’s neo-corporatist 
arrangements and its more consultative 
style of the executive compared to oth-
8 See the results of the Politbarometer longi-



















er post-communist executives produced 
a particular (neo-corporatist) variation 
of capitalism (Bohle and Greskovits, 
2007), which allowed for the mainte-
nance of a rather stable and prosperous 
welfare-state. Indeed, while Slovenia’s 
1991 constitution establishes Slovenia as 
‘a welfare state/socialna država’ and sub-
sequent policies effectively maintained 
the welfare state, the governments in 
the Baltic states have neither signifi-
cantly protected the national economies 
nor maintained social welfare institu-
tions. Meanwhile, although the Vise-
grád countries have to some extent been 
protective, Slovenia is not comparable 
on the same level. Unlike other coun-
tries, Slovenia was previously able to rely 
on its solid financial and economic ba-
sis (Mencinger, 1997), which enabled its 
various governments to opt for gradu-
alism in economic transformation and 
for the development of neo-corporatist 
arrangements which enabled the com-
promises required in order to balance 
socially inclusive development (Boh-
le and Greskovits, 2007; Stanojević and 
Krašovec, 2011). Until very recently, Slo-
venian governments were relatively au-
tonomous in their relationships with 
the external financial powers and (with 
the support of the parliament) opted for 
gradualist policy changes in all key poli-
cy fields, including privatization and the 
social functions of the state.
The Impacts of Globalization 
(Particularly Europeanization) 
on the Re-arrangement 
of the National Political System 
Even though the establishment of 
a newly independent state depended 
heavily on international and European 
supranational politics, Slovenia quick-
ly received international recognition 
without problem. Internally, the estab-
lishment of a new state necessitated the 
establishment of state structures/poli-
cy sectors, which had previously only 
functioned at the former Yugoslav fede-
ral level (including international rela-
tions, finances and defense institutions 
and policies). In the process of multiple 
transitions, the Slovenian government 
intensively sought opportunities for po-
licy learning and started with a lively in-
volvement in the various intergovern-
mental policy co-operations (see more 
in Fink-Hafner, ed., 2010). Upon joining 
the European integration processes, this 
phenomenon intensified.
In the process of accession to the 
EU, the Slovenian parliament (like other 
post-communist parliaments involved 
in the 2004 accession wave) was under 
considerable pressure to adopt hundreds 
of bills in a very short period of time in 
order to insert the acquis into the na-
tional law prior to becoming a full EU 
member state. Based on the agreement 
among parliamentary parties, the legis-
lative procedure was simplified and po-
litical consensus was achieved so as not 
to politicize EU-related matters. Numer-
ous laws were passed without significant 
deliberation to harmonize Slovenian law 
with the acquis.
Europeanization in terms of the 
overall adaptation of Slovenia’s political 
system to the functioning of the multi-
level EU system has resulted in both Slo-
venia joining the general trend and the 
persistence of some elements of Slove-
nia’s democratic idiosyncrasies. How-
ever, the general trend of empowering 
the executive in adapting the nation-
al political system to cope with the do-
mestic managing of EU affairs has been 
evident, not only in its formal re-ar-
























tioning. From the normative perspec-
tive, we can observe Slovenia’s proximity 
to a small number of EU member states 
which have emphasized the role of the 
national parliament in managing EU af-
fairs9 at the time of the country’s acces-
sion as well as currently (Hefftler et al., 
2013). In terms of the real-life function-
ing, the executive dominates the nation-
al parliament in the management of EU 
affairs (Košič, 2008; Fink-Hafner, 2008, 
2011).
The first year of Slovenia’s full mem-
bership of the European Union saw a 
significant reduction in the role of the 
parliament in managing European Uni-
on matters. When Slovenia took on the 
EU Presidency, the parliament primar-
ily assumed a coordinating role and in 
so doing chose to set aside Slovenia’s na-
tional interests. Certainly, following the 
accession stage, the National Assem-
bly became less involved in EU-related 
matters. It can also be said that, in the 
phase of ‘policy-taking’ from the Euro-
pean Union, one of Slovenia’s distinc-
tive features had been its commitment 
to the principle of full transparency in 
integration with the European Union,10 
while in the context of Slovenia’s full EU 
membership (in fact, in circumstances 
where Slovenia can take part in EU po-
9 See The Law on Collaboration between the 
National Assembly and the Government 
on European Union Matters (Zakon o sode-
lovanju med državnim zborom in vlado v 
zadevah evropske unije – ZSDZVZEU), 25 
March, 2004, National Assembly of the Re-
public of Slovenia (Državni zbor Republike 
Slovenije), Number: 007-01/03-11/3.
10 For a detailed comparative analysis of the 
transparency of the accession and the post-
accession stage of EU-related policy proces-
ses, see Fink-Hafner (2008). 
licymaking) the role of the parliament 
and the level of transparency in EU af-
fairs decreased in normative rules (law) 
and even more so in practice. Addition-
ally, there has been a major increase in 
the level of secrecy in managing Euro-
pean Union issues. The National Assem-
bly has tended simply to approve the go-
vernment’s proposals prepared by the 
executive, and the ability of the parlia-
ment to control the government in its 
participation in decision-making pro-
cesses at the EU level has declined. Since 
the National Assembly does not effi-
ciently use the available mechanisms 
and methods of involvement in Europe-
an policymaking – namely oversight of 
the national executive – Slovenia is con-
tributing to the European Union’s demo-
cratic deficit. It comes as no surprise that 
Slovenia’s involvement in soft-law mak-
ing is no less democratically problema-
tic than in other EU member states (see 
more in Fink-Hafner, ed., 2010). The 
same can be said of Slovenia’s involve-
ment in the recent ACTA scandal. Only 
following international public revelation 
of the scandal was public debate opened 
in Slovenia and consequently Slovenia’s 
ratification was ‘frozen’.11
The Impact of the Current Global 
Financial and Economic Crisis
Until the recent international finan-
cial and economic crisis, Slovenia had 
not been dependent on the financing of 
international financial organizations. Of 
11 Tudi slovenska vlada se nagiba k zamrznit-
vi ratifikacije Acte, Dnevnik, 16.2.2012, 
http://www.dnevnik.si/clanek/1042510249 
(22.8.2013); Slovenija – Acta: tudi naša vlada 





















critical importance for understanding 
the recent major financial change in Slo-
venia is the fact that, in the period im-
mediately after joining the EU (2005-
2008), Slovenia’s economic growth was 
based on easy access to foreign finance. 
When the international financial crisis 
hit Slovenia, the government decided 
to cover the increased social transfers, 
thus increasing the public debt whilst, 
crucially, Slovenian banks, citizens, the 
non-financial sector and the state re-
lied on loans from abroad (Mencinger, 
2012: 77). So, although Slovenia is 
among the least indebted EU member 
states and is the least indebted new EU 
member state (of the post-2004 acces-
sion rounds), Slovenia’s economic ac-
tivity has become stifled by the nega-
tive investments of the banks and the 
extraordinarily high share of enterprises 
in credit banks (ibid., note 25). Many 
economists, including Mencinger, warn 
that in such circumstances rapid finan-
cial and monetary tightening would fail 
to eliminate the dependency on cre-
dit as well as make it difficult to tack-
le the problem of liquidity faced by en-
terprises or the need to decrease banks 
loans from abroad, while (in such con-
ditions) only the state would be able to 
foster economic activity, and this would 
have to be achieved by obtaining more 
loans from abroad (ibid.: 78). Neverthe-
less, the various international pressures 
on Slovenia to adopt austerity measures 
in line with the neoliberal model have 
been increasing. An indicative case is 
the parliament’s adoption of the govern-
ment proposal to amend the constitu-
tion to limit state debt,12 while three out 
12 Constitutional Act amending Article 148 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Slo-
venia, adopted by the National Assembly 
of four parties in government which had 
previously opposed such an amendment 
openly admitted that they had rethought 
their position due to external pressures13 
(acting against the demands of the social 
protests).14 Furthermore, in the context 
of international pressure for reform, the 
of the Republic of Slovenia on 24.5.2013, 
http://www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=
201347&stevilka=1777 (30.8.2013).
13 See more in Je. G., Vlada začela posto-




Predlog ustavnega zakona z obrazložitvijo 
ustavnega zakona za spremembo in dopol-





čilo k Predlogu za začetek postopka za spre-
membo 148. člena Ustave Republike Sloveni-
je z osnutkom ustavnega zakona (UZ148), 
EPA 206-VI, Državni zbor RS, http://imss.
dz-rs.si/imis/ff018ae62a985aef1936.pdf 
(30.9.2013); Bratuškova: Fiskalno pravilo 
je zmaga vseh, 24ur.com, 24.5.2013, http://
www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/danes-dan-d-
za-vnos-fiskalnega-pravila.html (30.8.2013).
14 See e.g. Izjava za medije Gibanja za dostojno 
delo in socialno družbo o predvidenih spre-
membah ustave, ki se nanašajo na ureditev ref-
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rapid (and reduced) legislative proce-
dure has prevailed, which has prevented 
any proper policy deliberation from tak-
ing place.
The fact is that Slovenia has joined 
the ranks of the problematic countries 
at a point in time when the logic of aus-
terity measures as a way out of the crisis 
is being severely questioned. While the 
IMF has even admitted it may have been 
wrong15 and the EU also seems to be re-
considering the austerity paradigm, Slo-
venia is once again assuming the role of 
a ‘guinea pig’ for the revised solution to 
the financial crisis.16
Ultimately, it can be said that the 
pattern of subordination of the nation-
al executive to external pressures and its 
relative strengthening in relation to the 
national legislative and social partners 
did not originate with the international 
financial and economic crisis; rather, the 
crisis accelerated the existing trends in 
the weakening of the parliament in rela-
tion to the executive, and in the weaken-
ing of trade unions. Similarly, the crisis 
took the form that it did in Slovenia pri-
15 See e.g. Howard Schneider, An Amazing 
Mea Culpa from the IMF’s Chief Economist 




mist-on-austerity/ (30.8.2013); Larry Elliott, 
Phillip Inman and Helena Smith in Ath-
ens, IMF Admits: We Failed to Realize the 
Damage Austerity would do to Greece, The 




16 Adrian Marius Dobre, What is the Price of 
a Troika Deal, 6.6.2013, http://adrianmarius-
dobre.blogactiv.eu/2013/06/06/what-is-the-
price-of-a-troika-deal/ (6.9.2013).
marily due to the country-specific do-
mestic management of the economy and 
politics, which had made Slovenia finan-
cially (and politically) vulnerable. How-
ever, by becoming dependent on inter-
national loans, Slovenia has become 
increasingly similar to other post-com-
munist (de facto economically and poli-
tically peripheral) countries. The au-
thority now resides with the interna-
tional financial organizations and with 
the EU (the European Commission) to 
dictate the crisis and the post-crisis mo-
del of economic management in Slove-
nia. In such circumstances, the national 
executive behaves predominantly as the 
key national actor responsible for the 
execution of external dictates by using 
its parliamentary majority as a ‘voting 
machine’ to ensure the adoption of all 
imperative policy decisions.
Conclusions
In this article, we have discussed the 
general tendency of national executives 
to acquire power in relation to the le-
gislatures as part of their countries’ na-
tional and international adaptation to 
the processes of globalization and Eu-
ropeanization. The political pressures 
to adapt the national political systems to 
fit the requirements of EU membership 
have empowered the national executives 
over the national parliaments, which 
has exacerbated the lack of transparen-
cy and has reduced the citizens’ demo-
cratic involvement. This has been taking 
place in national contexts in which the 
current instability of the domestic par-
ties and government would otherwise 
support a trend toward the weakening of 
the executive (Johansson and Tallberg, 
2010) – including Slovenia. In undergo-
ing this process, new EU member states 


















older EU member states. Even though 
the executive has gained power over the 
parliament in the course of consolidat-
ing democracy, this has neither been the 
only nor the most decisive factor in pav-
ing the way for the disproportional in-
volvement of the executive in interna-
tional and supra-national policymaking, 
which tends to a great extent to be inter-
governmental. 
In post-communist countries, inten-
sive converging effects of both domestic 
and international (including European) 
pressures can be observed. In fact, they 
appear to be taking place more radical-
ly and rapidly than in older Western EU 
member states. The international finan-
cial and economic crisis has added to 
this trend. Additionally, the post-com-
munist EU member states have been re-
turning to the economic periphery; in 
relation to their economic power (re-
questing social/cohesion transfers with-
in the framework of the EU), they are 
also politically ‘peripherized’.
The case of Slovenia demonstrates 
that the key trigger for efficient inter-
national pressures to intervene decisive-
ly in domestic power relations between 
the executive and the parliament is the 
particular country’s financial and eco-
nomic dependence on external/interna-
tional financing. It is due to the condi-
tionality attached to the loans that the 
borrower is required to provide effi-
cient economic liberalization. Recent-
ly, it has been shown that the countries 
which have most closely followed the 
advice of the international organiza-
tions have also been hit hardest by the 
crisis (Andrews, 2012: 123). Slovenia is 
not yet among those countries; howev-
er, it seems unlikely that Slovenia will 
be able to control either the strategy of 
managing its way out of its financial and 
economic crisis or the subordination of 
the national political elite/the key na-
tional political decision-making insti-
tutions. While the social response is a 
critical delegitimization of the nation-
al political elite (which has accentuated 
the existing political instability and pro-
vokes ever louder calls for an alternative 
political system and a more direct de-
mocracy), the external pressures in fact 
support the national executive’s instru-
mentalization of the parliament and fur-
ther alienate the political elite from the 
national voting public.
The changing relations between the 
executive and the legislature is a symp-
tom of a deeper crisis of both the pre-
dominant mode of capitalism and the 
predominant paradigm of managing 
contemporary societies, countries and 
the world. The current crisis is therefore 
not only financial and economic, but 
also a crisis of political legitimacy in the 
context of the democratic deficit that is 
global, EU-wide and national. The case 
study of Slovenia reveals a mechanism 
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Prema dominaciji izvršne vlasti
SAŽETAK  Rad istražuje recentne procese globalizacije te (u tom kontekstu) proces euro-
peizacije, s fokusom na promjenama nacionalnih političkih sustava (posebice u postko-
munističkim zemljama članicama EU-a) koje su rezultat utjecaja tih procesa. Osnovna je 
teza rada da je nacionalna egzekutiva pod međunarodnim pritiscima i zahtjevima posti-
gla dodatnu akumulaciju moći u odnosu na zakonodavnu vlast. Međunarodna financijska 
i ekonomska kriza doprinijela je tom trendu jer su države postale dodatno financijski ovi-
sne o međunarodnim centrima moći koji od nacionalnih izvršnih vlasti zahtijevaju efika-
sniju ekonomsku liberalizaciju kao preduvjet traženih međunarodnih pozajmica. Studija 
slučaja Slovenije prikazana je u komparativnoj perspektivi (u pojedinim aspektima prika-
zana kao devijantni slučaj) tako da nudi nove teorijske uvide u mehanizme koji jačaju na-
cionalne egzekutive. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  globalizacija, europeizacija, postkomunističke države, egzekutiva, kriza
